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On Saturday, October 27, 2018, a man with anti-Semitic motivations entered Tree of Life synagogue 
in the Squirrel Hill section of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; he had an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle and 
three handguns, opening fire upon worshippers. Eventually 11 civilians died at the scene and eight 
people sustained non-fatal injuries, including five police officers. Each person injured but alive at the 
scene received care at one of three local level-one trauma centers.  The injured had wounds often 
seen in war-settings, with the signature of high velocity weaponry.  We describe the scene response, 
specific elements of our hospital plans, the overall out-of-hospital preparedness in Pittsburgh, and 
the lessons learned. [West J Emerg Med. 2020;21(2)374–381.]
INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, October 27, 2018, a man with anti-Semitic 
motivations entered Tree of Life synagogue in the Squirrel 
Hill section of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He had an AR-15 
semi-automatic rifle and three handguns, and used these to 
open fire upon the worshippers. Eventually, eleven civilians 
died at the scene and eight people, including five police 
officers, sustained non-fatal injuries. Each person injured but 
alive at the scene received care at one of three local level-one 
trauma centers and survived. We describe elements of out-of-
hospital and in-hospital preparedness in Pittsburgh, medical 
response during the event, and the lessons learned.
PREPAREDNESS IN PITTSBURGH
Prehospital Physician Response 
Since its origin in 1981, the Emergency Medicine (EM) 
residency at the University of Pittsburgh includes a “24/7/365” 
physician response to specific out of hospital emergencies.1,2 
Emergency Medicine residents (PGY II and PGY III) with 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) training and certification 
staff a response vehicle equipped with radios, emergency 
warning lights, medications, and medical equipment; they 
are overseen by a certified attending EMS medical command 
physician available by radio and phone. Emergency medicine 
faculty and residents work closely with members of the City 
of Pittsburgh Bureau of Public Safety (Police, Fire, and EMS) 
to give protocol and on-scene medical direction while gaining 
out of hospital care experience. 
Tactical EMS in Pittsburgh 
The National Tactical Officers Association recommends 
that special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams include trained 
tactical emergency medical providers.3 In 2011 the City of 
Pittsburgh EMS division enrolled 16 paramedics into SWAT 
courses and subsequently integrated them into a Tactical EMS 
(TEMS team). Members of the TEMS team assist with medical 
threat assessment, pre-deployment team preventative health 
care, and point-of-injury medical care. The SWAT/TEMS 
Regional Medical Director, an emergency physician serving 
as a faculty member in the residency training program at the 
University of Pittsburgh, trains and deploys with the team. Each 
SWAT operator carries a standardized Individual First Aid Kit 
(IFAK) and tourniquet (Table 1), and the TEMS medics carry 
similar equipment augmented with additional medical gear. 
Out-of-Hospital Preparation and Practice
Based on learning from prior events, UPMC and the 
City of Pittsburgh recognized the importance of joint training 
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and response coordinated centrally across all arms of local 
public safety. In 2017, the city began a joint active shooter 
training series for public safety agencies, beginning with a 
formalized introductory course, followed by focused agency 
level training, and finally, ongoing joint exercises of varying 
scales. The goal was to develop and practice a preferred model 
of response to active shooter events that would function in 
parallel with tactical operations of SWAT and TEMS units.  
The joint model utilizes combined response teams that 
allow first responders rapid access to patients to provide 
immediate lifesaving interventions, rapid extrication, and 
transport to a trauma facility under the protection of law 
enforcement personnel. Formation of a Rescue Task Force 
(RTF) made up of SWAT and TEMS personnel aids in early 
patient intervention beyond the cold zone and with limited 
staging delay.  
On-scene medical preparation for law enforcement and 
first responders is led by the City Bureau of EMS, with a focus 
on standardizing self- and buddy-care of law enforcement 
personnel along with immediate external hemorrhage control 
of victims by any available responder. Tourniquet training 
and dissemination, along with adding IFAKs to duty gear, 
followed in all public safety agencies. The City also added 
protective ballistic body armor to standard EMS uniforms. 
Our EMS providers are trained in systematic triage and 
implementation of life-saving interventions in zones of active 
fire, upon extrication from danger and during transport.  
This training uses the Sort, Assess, Lifesaving 
Interventions, Treatment/Transport (SALT) triage system and 
the principles of Tactical Combat Casualty Care, teaching 
techniques for extremity and junctional hemorrhage control 
and utilization of hemostatic agents. The program also focuses 
on key rapid life-saving interventions, including airway 
maneuvers and ventilation, chest decompression and seals, 
intraosseous access, fluid resuscitation principles, and optimal 
care of the head injury patient. This background translated into 
efficient and directed care on scene at Tree of Life.
Years before this event, the Pittsburgh Bureau of Public 
Safety proactively developed an active threat plan and practiced 
in advance; they did this after heeding experiences locally and 
nationally. The most recent preparedness session occurred just 
months earlier, a few blocks from the synagogue involved.
In-Hospital Preparation
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Presbyterian 
University Hospital, which received the bulk of the patients 
from this event, has a Mass Casualty Incident(MCI) plan refined 
through several years of exercises and informed by lessons 
learned elsewhere, especially in Israel. The approach uses the 
underlying principle of keeping care as simple as possible.4 
Based on the Israeli model, “Job-Action cards” exist (e.g., ED 
attending, charge nurse, triage nurse, lead trauma attending, 
etc.) and are distributed at the time of MCI plan activation.  
Each card is a single laminated page with a stepwise checklist 
of actions to be completed. Provider instructions are simple 
and focus on simplicity of duties and roles: “You don’t need to 
memorize the plan, you just have to know where to find it when 
you need it and then follow the checklist.”
The plan calls for a lead ED attending and trauma surgeon 
to divide providers into care teams. The anesthesia liaison in 
the ED coordinates with the operating rooms to cancel elective 
surgery. The critical care liaison works with the Administrator 
on Duty (AOD) to create Intensive Care Unit capacity. 
The internal medicine liaison prepares to call in additional 
inpatient staff and create capacity.  
The hospital central supply unit sends three large pre-
prepared disaster carts with additional trauma and respiratory 
supplies. These carts are kept centrally and sent to the ED 
with MCI plan activation. Similarly, the hospital pharmacy 
maintains an emergency cache of medications for pain and 
rapid sequence induction which are also automatically sent 
to the ED. The blood bank sends a pre-prepared cache of 
emergency blood products.  
Community Readiness 
Over the past three years, our region adopted a model that 
stresses the importance of layperson action in an emergency. 
This is a paradigm shift from the previous “call 911 and 
wait” to one of engaging the layperson in providing basic aid 
after calling for help. Our system started with focus on three 
key emergent conditions as targets for prehospital citizen 
intervention: out-of-hospital cardiac arrest (OHCA), opioid 
overdose, and severe hemorrhage.  
To lay a foundation for citizen response, our 911 
infrastructure incorporates a bystander notification system, 
PulsePoint (www.pulsepoint.org). When 911 dispatches units 
1x - Ratcheting medical tourniquet (RMT) 1.5” - Tactical
1x - Hemostatic gauze bandage
1x - Compression bandage
1x - Nasopharyngeal airway 28Fr with lubricant
1x - FASTBreathe thoracic seal (FTS) - vented
1x - FAST combat wound seal (CWS)6
1x - Compressed sterile gauze 4” x 4 yards
2x - Tefla non-adherent pad 3” x 6”
1x - Emergency Mylar blanket
1x - Band-aid pack
1x - Surgical cloth tape 1” x 10 yards
1x - HD nitrile gloves (pair) extra large
1x - Activity trauma shears 5”
1x - Casualty/treatment card
1x - Active trauma pouch “ATP” vehicle system
Table 1. Contents of Individual First Aid Kits (IFAK) carried by 
Pittsburgh SWAT officers.
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to an OHCA, laypeople within a quarter-mile radius of the 
scene are simultaneously dispatched via GPS localization. 
The smartphone-based application also provides access to our 
county-wide Automated External Defibrillator (AED) registry 
on the map. 
Public safety and government partners worked with 
local philanthropic and healthcare entities to allow for 
implementation of PulsePoint and initiate mass-training 
programs in public arenas such as schools and universities, 
religious sites, and local events. Where early efforts 
concentrated on CPR and AED, the citizen response 
model also began opioid overdose and severe hemorrhage 
intervention teaching. 
Regarding efforts for severe external hemorrhage, the 
national Stop the Bleed (STB) Campaign empowers laypeople 
in first response to bleeding emergencies, especially of the 
extremities. Through the multidisciplinary work of trauma 
surgery, emergency medicine, Pittsburgh EMS, and local 
philanthropic support, we trained over 37,000 individuals 
and distributed over 500 bleeding control kits, and 9,000 
tourniquets to police officers. The program also employs 
mass training programs at schools. STB efforts in Pittsburgh 
involved the Jewish community, where several synagogues 
(including Tree of Life) trained and received bleeding control 
kits prior to the event on October 27, 2018.  
EVENT TIMELINE AND MEDICAL RESPONSE 
Scene Response
Just before 10 AM on the event date, the Allegheny 
County 911 Center alerted Pittsburgh EMS and police of a 
possible active shooter at a synagogue in Squirrel Hill. An EM 
resident, the City EMS Medical Director, and a City Assistant 
EMS Medical Director responded to a staging area, while the 
SWAT/TEMS Medical Director rendezvoused with his team.
The Tree of Life congregation recently had STB training 
and had a fully stocked STB kit near a main entrance of the 
facility. Unfortunately, wounded civilians on scene were 
unable to access the kit due to the ongoing danger of the 
shooter moving through the structure. 
Within minutes of the initial alert, an EMS Command 
Post was created two city blocks from the active shooter 
event to allow briefing of all physicians and other personnel 
by the Incident Commander. At Command Post set-up, 
gunfire existed in the synagogue and it was unclear how 
many worshipers were in the synagogue for Sabbath services. 
The synagogue is home to three congregations, multiple 
classrooms and a basement meeting room. 
Meanwhile, staff at the UPMC Communications Center, 
which provides medical command and hospital notifications 
for regional ground and aeromedical agencies, along with the 
county 911/Emergency Operations Center, gathered regional 
hospital capabilities and relayed that information to the EMS 
Incident Commander. In addition, communications specialists 
tracked ambulance transport destinations and provided that 
information to the on-scene physicians. The EMS physicians 
on-scene spoke directly to EM leadership, who relayed 
information to all sites involved and gave real time updates. 
The on-scene EMS physicians also assisted with patient 
destination decisions (Figure 1).
TEMS paramedics initiated care of trauma victims based 
on statewide protocols and at the direction of the physician 
embedded with the tactical teams. Although there was no 
shortage of supplies, multiple SWAT operators lacked IFAK 
and tourniquets when inspected after the event.  
Victims, including two civilians and four police officers, 
were transported to the two closest adult trauma centers. 
Proximity to the scene was the primary motivation for 
transporting patients to the closest appropriate facility. 
Physicians relayed the capacity of the facilities based on real 
time information from the hospitals. Based on the location 
of the incident, limited exit routes, and the capacity of the 
hospitals at the time, most patients were transported to UPMC 
Presbyterian, which lies on the most direct route from the 
scene and was prepared to accept a large number of patients. 
Once captured, the injured gunman was transported to the 
third adult trauma center; this was a decision made jointly 
by on-scene physicians and the EMS Incident Commander, 
seeking to separate the assailant from the victims. 
All victims with extremity injuries had a tourniquet(s) 
placed on-scene or en route. Eleven additional victims in the 
synagogue were recognized dead and not transported. Prior to 
leaving the scene, the EMS physicians gathered patient status 
information from the receiving facilities and this information 
was relayed to the EMS Chief.
Timeline of EMS activity on scene
Note: timeline is based on radio traffic, which may not 
always reflect real-time (Figure 2).
09:55 – Call received at Public Safety Answering Point 
of an Active Shooter at Tree of Life Synagogue. Local police 
patrol units and medic units dispatched to the scene.
09:57 - EMS requested a Rapid Activation Team 
activation, which includes: One District Chief, five Advanced 
Life Support units, two Basic Life Support ambulances, 
two rescue trucks, mass casualty unit, field physician, plus a 
level-one county MCI response of five ambulances and one 
supervisor. The SWAT/TEMS team activation also occurred.
09:59 - Two police patrol units arrived and engaged the 
gunman as he appeared to be leaving the synagogue. Both law 
enforcement officers incurred injuries during the exchange. 
EMS requested to have both injured officers brought out to 
the “warm zone,” a distant safer area with physical structures 
impeding the shooter’s line of site. 
Upon assessment by EMS, one officer was found to 
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UPMC Communications Center
Allegheny County 
911/Emergency Operations Center
On scene
command 
post
Physician 
communications
Figure 1. Communications network utilized during the event.
UPMC, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.
Figure 2. Timeline of EMS activity on scene during the Tree of Life synagogue mass shooting in Pittsburgh, October 27, 2018. 
EMS, Emergency Medical Services; SWAT, Special Weapons and Tactics; TEMS, Tactical Emergency Medical Services; EET, 
Emergency Entry Team; RTF, Rescue Task Force; CCP, Casualty Collection Point; IEDs, Improvised Explosive Devices.
have upper and lower extremity wounds (patient 1) that 
were treated at the scene with compression dressings and a 
tourniquet before the officer/patient was transferred to a local 
trauma center. The time from injury to Emergency Department 
(ED) arrival was under 20 minutes. A second law enforcement 
officer assessed by EMS had superficial lacerations of the face 
and was transferred non-emergently to the hospital (patient 2).  
A summary of patients is presented in Table 2.
10:02 -EMS established an Incident Command post and 
safe staging area approximately two blocks from the scene. In 
the next four minutes, five medic units arrived and the EMS 
District Chief on duty began staging at the post.
Over the next several minutes, arriving SWAT team 
operators formed an Emergency Entry Team (EET). As 
TEMS paramedics arrived on scene, they paired with law 
enforcement to form an RTF. As the EMS Physicians arrived, 
they reported to the EMS Command post. Local hospitals 
leaders – using pre-established protocols - were notified of the 
event to prepare and to gain bed availability data for the EMS 
incident command post.
  
10:15 – The RTF unit at the staging post moved closer in to 
the active area and held a cover position outside the structure.
10:20 to 10:30 – Additional SWAT and TEMS personnel 
arrived and more EETs formed. These teams deployed 
to separate entrances of the synagogue.  Each EET had 
embedded TEMS.  
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Table 2. Description of injuries and on-scene medical interventions. 
Patient Description On-Scene Interventions
1 Police officer with upper/lower extremity wounds Tourniquet, compression dressings
2 Police officer with superficial facial lacerations Simple bandages
3 Civilian with gunshot wound to lower abdomen None
4 Civilian with extremity injury Tourniquet and compression dressings
5 SWAT officer with head, neck, multiple extremity wounds Tourniquets, wound care
6 SWAT officer with extremity wound Tourniquets, hemostatic agent, pressure dressing
7 Shooter with extremity wounds Tourniquet, hemostatic agent, pressure dressing
8 SWAT officer with hearing loss Not transported by EMS
SWAT, special weapons and tactics; EMS, emergency medical services. 
Additionally, eleven victims sustained fatal wounds on-scene of the incident.
10:32 to 10:33 – The EETs entered the synagogue via 
separate entrances and began clearing their respective areas.  
One EET remotely assessed their assigned area and found 
what appeared to be multiple deceased victims. This was 
confirmed upon entry. The second EET discovered several 
civilians hiding and escorted them out of the synagogue.
10:35 – Two injured civilians were found as the entry teams 
and TEMS medics pushed forward; one with a gunshot wound 
to the lower abdomen, one with an extremity wound (patients 
3 and 4). Patient 4 had pressure dressings and a tourniquet 
applied, followed by extrication from the synagogue. 
10:50 – As the EET passed through the structure, 
members of the TEMS team established a Casualty Collection 
Point (CCP) inside the building.  
10:55 - SWAT contacted the shooter, with initial reports 
of shots fired and an officer down and officer wounded 
transmitted. The injured SWAT operator was removed from 
the area of the gun battle and carried to the CCP established 
by TEMS (patient 5). At the CCP, the TEMS paramedics and 
physician assessed the injured officer and identified multiple 
extremity injuries along with a head wound. The team placed 
tourniquets on the bleeding extremities and bandaged the head 
wound. Once extricated, the officer went to a Level I trauma 
center via ambulance. Time from TEMS contact to ED arrival 
was approximately 20 minutes.
10:56 -  A second SWAT operator (patient 6) suffered an 
upper extremity wound but was unable to move to the CCP 
because of his position and the ongoing gunfight. Another 
SWAT operator applied a tourniquet.
11:07 – The assailant was barricaded.
11:13 – The shooter (patient 7) was taken into custody. 
His extremity wounds received a tourniquet and hemostatic 
dressings, and he was taken to the third trauma center.
11:17 – The second wounded SWAT operator (patient 6) 
moved to the CCP; the team noted an upper extremity wound. 
Despite initial placement of a tourniquet, hemostasis was 
inadequate. A second tourniquet and a hemostatic dressing 
then controlled the bleeding. The wounded SWAT officer 
walked to an ambulance and arrived at a Level I trauma center 
approximately 38 minutes after TEMS contact.
11:31 - Reports of possible Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs) inside the structure and the shooter’s vehicle.  All units 
and individuals staged in the warm zone pulled back.
11:51 - All potential IEDs are inspected by Explosive 
Ordinance Disposal and declared safe.
12:03 - Structure and scene declared safe and cleared by 
SWAT command.  
Hospital Response
Pittsburgh has three level-one adult trauma centers: 
UPMC Presbyterian (2.4 miles from the scene), UPMC 
Mercy (3.7 miles), and Allegheny General Hospital (8 miles). 
The only pediatric trauma center is the Children’s Hospital 
of Pittsburgh of UPMC (2.7 miles). UPMC Presbyterian 
Hospital, the closest trauma center to the incident, had ten 
patients in the ED (an atypically low number) when the 
shooting began.  There were two attending physicians and four 
residents on duty, along with a trauma team staffed by one 
attending trauma surgeon and four surgical residents.  
At 10:04 am, the ED received the first notification of the 
active shooter situation. ED and trauma staff and the hospital 
AOD immediately activated the hospital MCI plan. However, 
due to confusion in terminology between the AOD and 
hospital operator, a “Bronze Alert,” the hospital’s designation 
for an active shooter inside the building, was sent out through 
the Emergency Notification System (ENS) to more than 
10,000 staff members. This led to confusion amongst some 
off-duty providers as to whether it was safe to respond to 
the hospital and amongst those already in the building as 
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to the location of the incident. This represents one area for 
improvement from the incident.
Nonetheless, many providers quickly mobilized to the 
ED. In a trend like that noted in past mass shooting events, 
many of these providers “self-dispatched” from other areas in 
the hospital and from home. The attending trauma surgeons 
also communicated internally using a group-text. Within 45 
minutes of the initial notification, there were approximately 
100 additional providers and ancillary staff ready to receive 
wounded patients, including physicians from emergency 
medicine, trauma, vascular, orthopedic, and neurological 
surgery, anesthesia, and critical care.  
During the time that it took to declare the shooting scene 
safe, information on the number and type of patients being 
transported varied. Hospital providers, getting information 
from news media, personal contacts, and official channels, had 
wide estimates - ranging from four to 40 patients. Ultimately, 
five patients came to UPMC Presbyterian, one to UPMC 
Mercy, and one to Allegheny General Hospital.
During and after the incident, dozens of armed law 
enforcement officers from various agencies (local, county, and 
state police and federal agents) presented to the ED, leading to 
some angst with staff about who was responsible for verifying 
their credentials.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT (Table 3)
Acts of Violence Can Happen Anywhere
Since 2000, Pittsburgh has topped the most livable city 
lists six times.5 The city celebrates its diversity and is known 
for its friendly demeanor. Pittsburgh is now added to the list 
of cities that believed “this could never happen here” but 
experienced an event.
SWAT Operators Need IFAK Checks, Like for Any 
Equipment
The SWAT officers tend to have multiple armor sets/
configurations that they don and doff. Officers frequently move 
their IFAK and tourniquets between armor sets.  This risks 
leaving the operators without IFAK and tourniquets because 
of the need for rapid response and forgetting to transfer their 
medical gear. We recognized some gaps in this facet that were 
apparent once debriefing occurred.
Wounds Can Mirror Modern Combat Theatre Even in 
Civilian Public Mass Shooting Incidents (CPMS)6  
The two injured SWAT operators suffered extremity 
hemorrhage like combat theatre injuries. As with the military, 
the type of armor used during SWAT operations protects most 
of the thoracoabdominal area and head but exposes the 
extremities and face/neck areas to injury.7 This makes 
extremity hemorrhage control extremely important. Civilian 
wounds from this incident, as observed by on-scene 
physicians and EMS personnel, closely matched injury 
patterns in other CPMS events.8
A Single Tourniquet May Not Achieve Adequate Hemostasis
Both SWAT operators wounded in the shooting required 
multiple tourniquets on their wounded limbs. Each tourniquet 
was properly placed, tightened, inspected, and re-tightened 
before deploying a second tourniquet. As noted, one operator 
suffered upper extremity bleeding that was not adequately 
controlled by a single tourniquet. Due to his location, he was 
isolated from TEMS personnel for ~18 minutes due to active 
gunfire and juxtaposition to the rest of the team. This case 
illustrates the importance of every officer having at least one 
tourniquet on their equipment, and having multiple tourniquets 
and IFAK for select personnel who are “in close” to any 
exchange of gunfire.
TEMS Elements Deployed As Far Forward as Safely 
Possible Save Lives
In the instance of the most critically injured SWAT operator, 
minutes elapsed between him being shot multiple times and 
delivery to the TEMS staging area. Immediate point-of-injury 
care was started by the embedded SWAT physician (the team’s 
medical director) and a full complement of TEMS medics. 
This allowed for a full assessment and treatment in under 
three minutes with transport immediately afterward. Two other 
patients with potentially life-threatening extremity hemorrhages 
received TEMS forward care; both patients’ wounds could have 
easily resulted in death if delays occurred. As such, aggressive 
uniformed officer engagement with the assailant, persistent and 
infiltrative tactics by SWAT operators and accompanying TEMS 
units, and parallel formation and utilization of RTFs should 
serve as a response model when feasible.  
The Location of Staged Medical Equipment Matters
On scene medical equipment was not accessed because of 
security concerns. The synagogue’s STB kit was in a visible, 
central location – a location creating danger since the shooter 
had access to the area. Although we feel that STB training is 
an invaluable community resource, we did learn in this case 
that the location of staged equipment is a critical (and perhaps 
under-emphasized) point.
Training on Terminology and Activation of Hospital-wide 
Alerts is Critical and Requires Frequent Reinforcement
The initial activation of the Bronze alert led to confusion. 
Our hospitals have responded with increased training for staff 
and updated guidelines on how to activate the MCI plan.
In the Event of an MCI, Many Providers Will Self-present 
to the Hospital Without Being Called  
While it is important to have a pre-designated system for 
calling in back-up, this volunteerism can create the possibility 
of having too many providers respond. A process should 
be in place to screen, allocate, and decline use of additional 
volunteers. Our hospital MCI plan is being updated to establish 
a “volunteer” center in an area separate from the ED.
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Table 3. Lessons learned from the Tree of Life synagogue mass shooting in Pittsburgh, October 27, 2018.
Preparation and planning
• Acts of violence can happen anywhere.
• The location of staged medical equipment matters.
• Training on terminology and activation of hospital-wide alerts is critical and requires frequent reinforcement.
• Mass casualty planning shuold be multi-disciplinary and involve both healthcare providers and ancillary services. Frequent 
exercises are crucial.
• Have plans to confirm the identity of law enforcement officers and to manage their flow into care sites.
Incident response
• SWAT operators need IFAK cheks, like for any equipment.
• Wounds can mirror modern combat theatre even in civilian public mass shooting incidents.
• A single tourniquet may not achieve adequate hemostasis.
• TEMS elements deployed as faw forward as safely possible save lives. 
• In the event of a mass casualty incident, many providers will self-present to the hospital without being called.
• Casualty data are unreliable early in an MCI or active shooter situation. Err on the side of over-estimating need during the initial 
response.
MCI Planning Should be Multi-disciplinary and Involve 
Both Healthcare Providers and Ancillary Services.  
Frequent Exercises are Crucial
The hospital response involved a highly coordinated set 
of actions involving numerous personnel and predesignated 
supplies. These actions all came from a plan, created in 
advance and practiced in both table-top and simulation drills. 
Casualty Data are Unreliable Early in an MCI or Active 
Shooter Situation. Err on the Side of Over-estimating Need 
During the Initial Response9
With numerous sources of information, accurate planning 
based on need is challenging. A lesson learned from previous 
drills was that of having MCI plans (prehospital and hospital) 
that are activated based on known or anticipated victims to 
avoid delay or an inadequate medical response. In this event, 
the number of potential victims was initially unknown; the 
closest adult trauma center initiated their MCI plan based on 
the limited information available, “preparing for the worst.” 
As a result, the hospital easily accepted all incoming patients 
and had the capacity to care for more injured patients if 
needed. Similarly, the other two adult trauma centers enacted 
response plans, each ready to accept patients above the usual 
expected for a Saturday morning.
Have Plans to Confirm the Identity of Law Enforcement 
Officers and to Manage Their Flow into Care Sites
While understandable (and perhaps unavoidable) that law 
enforcement will present to the hospital, preparedness efforts 
should include coordination with hospital security personnel 
to create plans for their access.  
CONCLUSION
The mass shooting incident at the Tree of Life synagogue 
on Oct 27, 2018 in Pittsburgh used a coordinated multi-agency 
response. Planning, practice in advance, close medical provider 
and safety officer integration, scene safety, initial evaluation 
zones, and tourniquet use saved lives in this event, and we 
learned lessons to improve future preparations and responses.
SWAT, Special Weapons and Tactics; IFAK, Individual First Aid Kit; TEMS, Tactical Emergency Medical Services; MCI, Mass Casualty Incident.
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